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We argue that the capacity to live life to the benefit of self and others originates in the
defining properties of life. These lead to two modes of cognition; the coping mode that
is preoccupied with the satisfaction of pressing needs and the co-creation mode that
aims at the realization of a world where pressing needs occur less frequently. We have
used the Rule of Conservative Changes – stating that new functions can only scaffold on
evolutionary older, yet highly stable functions – to predict that the interplay of these two
modes define a number of core functions in psychology associated with moral behavior.
We explore this prediction with five examples reflecting different theoretical approaches
to human cognition and action selection. We conclude the paper with the observation
that science is currently dominated by the coping mode and that the benefits of the co-
creation mode may be necessary to generate realistic prospects for a modern synthesis
in the sciences of the mind.
Keywords: autopoiesis, enactivism, morals, intelligence, sustainability, resilience, understanding, wisdom
Introduction
Humans have a moral capacity to live life to the beneﬁt of self and others. The question we address
in this paper is “where does this capacity originate from and what are its deﬁning features?” We
argue that “the capacity to live life to the beneﬁt of self and others” is a direct consequence of the
deﬁning properties of life that originated when individuals in overlapping habitats became to exist.
In fact, we argue that the main constraints on behavior – and with that much of psychology – orig-
inated in the deﬁning properties of life itself. This paper investigates the features of these essential
“sub-psychological” or “pre-neural” roots and uses them to reinterpret results related to selection
of behavior. As a whole the paper aims to provide a novel and productive framework to address
issues related to how agents – whether human, animal, or artiﬁcial – decide on their behavior in
an open world and outside the conﬁnes of controlled environments such as laboratories. In addi-
tion, we show that our framework provides, conform the call for papers, prospects for a modern
synthesis to the sciences of the mind.
A main message of this meta-theoretical paper is that the deﬁnition of agentic life leads to
two modes of cognition: a ‘coping mode’ and a ‘co-creation mode.’ The coping mode exists to
address pressing needs and is a way to survive on the short term. The co-creation mode is
prominent whenever all pressing needs are satisﬁed. It exists to explore the opportunities of
the habitat and co-creates an environment in which the emergence of pressing needs becomes
less likely. Co-creation requires agents to take both the long term as well as an extended
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spatial environment into account. We argue that humanmorality
originals from the contributions of these two modes. Individuals
in the coping mode are preoccupied with their very own existence
and as such they may become locally oriented, short-term “ego-
centric” sources of potentially destructive, yet immediately self-
saving, behavior. On the other hand individuals in the co-creation
mode are concerned with the overall quality and dynamic sta-
bility – resilience – of the Umwelt (von Uexküll, 1992) and the
possible futures it entails for them and others. As such they ben-
eﬁt from others in the co-creation mode and they promote the
reduction of the number of connected individuals who are in or
are likely to slip into the coping mode. We argue that these two
modes of cognition are not only the roots of moral behavior, but
also deﬁne the dynamic that stabilizes the whole biosphere.
Paper Structure
The development of ideas in this paper is as follows: we will con-
clude the introduction with an important postulate – the Rule
of Conservative Changes – that we use to justify the continuity
between the deﬁnition of life and modern humanity.
In the Section, “Cognition from Life,” we outline a number of
key concepts of the enactive approach to cognition (Thompson,
2007) that forms the theoretical underpinning for the two basic
modes of cognition that we identify: the ‘coping mode’ and the
‘co-creation mode.’ Together these deﬁne ‘core cognition’ (see
Figure 2).
In the Section “Unicellular Cooperation Virtues,” we start with
connecting the roots of human morality by assuming that groups
of unicellular individuals can have varying fractions of individ-
uals in the coping and the co-creation mode. Cooperation and
interaction may play out diﬀerently given the (combination of)
diﬀerent modes.
In the Section “Human cognition from Life” we skip a number
of billion years and we scale-up the number of cells in the organ-
ism by a factor of 1014. At the same time we predict, on the basis
of the Rule of Conservative Change, that nothing fundamental
(“essential”) has changed: humans implement core cognition just
as bacteria do. We explore this prediction with ﬁve examples
reﬂecting diﬀerent theoretical approaches to human cognition:
(1) how the cerebral hemispheres understand the world, (2) how
theories of ‘dual type processing’ of higher cognition relate to the
two modes, (3) the origin of concepts such as power and wisdom,
intelligence and understanding, and authority, (4) the unicellu-
lar cooperation origin of the 2+3 structure preserved in human
moral values, and (5) we link the structure of positive emotions
to the logic of the co-creation mode.
We conclude with the section “Prospects for a ‘Modern
Synthesis’ in the Sciences of the Mind,” stating that a search for
unity in science should start with unity of existence. A prominent
role for the co-creation mode in science allows to progressively
specify, adapt, and enrich this unity more and more by encom-
passing evermore theories and phenomena.
Meta-Theoretic Departure Point
The Rule of Conservative Changes (Ghysen, 2003) states that
in evolution new functions scaﬀold on older functions and as
such preserve the essential from the very beginning. It repre-
sents the essence of our argument to connect the deﬁnition
of life to moral and political behavior. Ghysen formulated the
Rule of Conservative Changes as a necessary consequence of
the complexity of the developmental programs, both ontoge-
netic and phylogenetic, of evolution1. The very complexity of
the developmental programs demands that the basic infrastruc-
tures on which evolutionary more recent functions rely must be
“extremely stable so that they can withstand substantial variation
without collapsing.” According to Ghysen:
The rule of conservative changes states that only those changes
can be tolerated, that change essentially nothing. This rule
applies to any set of interacting elements, where changes in
any one component will alter all the interactions in which this
component is involved, and adversely aﬀect the function of the
entire set. The stringency of this rule will obviously increase
with the number of interactions, as it becomes more and more
unlikely that a single change in one element can improve, or at
least not harm, the result of the total sum of all interactions.
The rule in its most stringent form entails that whatever set
of functions that initially determined what is good or bad for
life must be conserved throughout evolution: it only tolerated
changes that “change essentially nothing.” Yet, the same strict
application of the rule will guarantee a very stable basis for inno-
vations to rely on. Consequently, if the Rule of Conservative
Changes applies, our moral values – suitably formulated – should
reﬂect what is good or bad for life and have a stable, evolutionary
old, basis. We will show that the structure of the unicellular level
“morals” is still reﬂected in the structure of human moral virtues
as formulated by Haidt (2007). Of course, a few billion years
of evolution have allowed humans to come up with extremely
intricate and convoluted ways to “change essentially nothing.”
Ghysen’s Rule of Conservative Changes imposes extreme sta-
bility constraints on the set of foundational older functions and
the rule demands that new capacities help to improve the exe-
cution of older functions (while changing essentially nothing).
However, it provides neither a starting point nor a direction. The
starting point we will use here is the deﬁnition of life as formu-
lated in the ﬁeld of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1991). To
impose limits on the direction of life’s development, we will use
the enactive cognition approach (Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014).
As such we build on the idea that the very notion of life, or more
precisely living agency, already deﬁnes many of the properties of
mind and our capacity to act in the world (Thompson, 2007). This
paper follows up on the suggestion of Froese and Ziemke (2009)
who conclude:
In order to develop a better theory of the biological roots of
intentional agency we ﬁrst need to gain a better understand-
ing of bacterium-level intelligence. Only by returning to the
beginnings of life itself do we stand any chance of establishing a
properly grounded theory of intentional agency and cognition.
1Ghysen limited himself to the evolution ofmetazoa (all animals except protozoans
and sponges). We apply the rule to all functions of life.
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Cognition from Life
This section builds on the Enactive approach to cognition
(Varela et al., 1993; Thompson, 2007; Froese and Ziemke,
2009; Di Paolo et al., 2010). The enactive approach to cog-
nition is based on the premise that cognition depends con-
stitutively on the living body, understood as an autonomous
system operating in a complex open environment. The enac-
tive approach is based on concepts like autonomy, embodiment,
sense-making in an environment and the activities it comprises,
and the emergence of functions and behaviors originating from
the interactions between the individual and its environment
(Di Paolo et al., 2010).
The core of the paradigm is probably most succinctly summa-
rized by the phrase “being by doing” (Froese and Ziemke, 2009).
Consequently, for an enactivist, a system is cognitive if its behav-
ior sustains its existence; a notion that we will take quite literally
in this section. This section addresses a number of core concepts
of the enactive approach (autopoiesis, viability, agency, behavior,
needful freedom, adaptivity) and, if necessary, reformulates, or
reinterprets them in such a way that they can be used in a wider
context while still be applicable in the original context. In addi-
tion, we separate two modes of cognition: one in which behavior
sustains existence in the long run and one that protects exis-
tence in times of adversity. Together these two modes address
existential needs in both the long and short term.
Autopoiesis: Needs, Identity, and
Normativity
’‘Autopoiesis’ (from Greek meaning “self creation” or “self-
production”) refers to a system capable of regenerating and
maintaining itself. The term was introduced in 1972 by Chilean
biologists HumbertoMaturana and Francisco Varela to deﬁne the
self-maintaining chemistry of living cells (Maturana and Varela,
1991). Autopoiesis refers to:
A network of processes of production (synthesis and destruc-
tion) of components such that these components:
(1) Continuously regenerate and realize the network that pro-
duces them, and
(2) Constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the
domain in which they exist.
Thermodynamic constraints demand that a living self-
maintaining system is far from equilibrium; consequently it
requires a continual supply of energy. The moment the system
looses its self-maintaining character, for example because it can
no longer maintain its energy supply, it dies and eventually
becomes an indistinguishable part of the environment. But as
long as it is alive, autopoiesis necessarily also implies (Paolo,
2006):
(1) The establishment of a distinct “self ” for which being is its
own doing and with physical and organizational distinctions
between inside and outside,
(2) An entity which is in constant environmental challenge, is in
need of material turnover and with the freedom to achieve it,
and
(3) The establishment of a normativity following the logic of
metabolism according to which otherwise neutral events,
both internal and external, can be good or bad for the
continuation of the organism.
This implies the emergence of a “self ” as a living entity that is
constantly challenged by its environment, for which the events
that inﬂuence it can now be evaluated in terms of facilitating or
hindering its continuation. With the “self ” comes a unique per-
spective or viewpoint, which implies for each living individual a
unique history, a unique perspective, and a unique way to ensure
its continuation. In short: with life comes an identity, the need
for material throughput, and norms about what is good or bad in
terms of consequences for the identity’s continued existence.
Agency and Behavior
However, an autopoietic entity, although autonomously respon-
sible for its own self-constitution, can still be limited to a ﬁxed
or externally controlled dynamic over which it has no control. As
such, it may be unable to co-determine the conditions in which
is exists. For co-determination, the entity needs to take control
over the way it interacts with its environment: it needs ‘agency.’
Barandiaran et al. (2009) deﬁne an agent as:
An autonomous organization that adaptively regulates its cou-
pling with its environment and contributes to sustaining itself
as a consequence.
Being agentic, or not, corresponds to being a passive recipi-
ent of environmental challenges or to (pro-)actively controlling
and selecting these environmental challenges (Paolo, 2006). Only
the second mode of interaction fully deserves the name ‘behavior’
(Paolo, 2006), because it is the agent that regulates its relation
to the environment. This agent-controlled regulation of the cou-
pling with the environment gives the organism whole new levels
of freedom to continue its existence. We will refer to his strategy
as ‘living agency’ (or ‘agency’ for short).
Needful Freedom
The relation between a living organism, as a dynamically main-
tained material structure, and the matter on which it depends,
leads to a form of existence that has been called ‘needful freedom’
(Froese and Ziemke, 2009):
This relation is best expressed through the fact that, while the
existential form of an organism is independent of any particu-
lar conﬁguration of matter through which it passes in virtue of
its metabolism, it is nevertheless dependent on the continual
perpetuation of this ongoing ﬂow of material conﬁgurations. If
this ﬂow ceases and the organic form fully coincides with its
current material conﬁguration then it is no longer living.
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Formulated like this, life is about need satisfaction: as long as an
entity exists that has the need for an ongoing material through-
put and sustains this throughput itself, it is alive and viable.
The moment the ongoing ﬂow cannot be sustained, the entity
becomes, again, part of its environment and looses its identity.
Needful freedom allows living agents the liberty to engage
with its environment in any of a multitude of ways to satisfy its
metabolic needs. This is the basis of the individual’s autonomy
and freedom that Di Paolo (2009) describes as follows:
The fact that metabolism sustains a dynamic form of identity
(not coinciding with its material constitution at any given time
except at the time of death) allows an organism to become free.
This freedom is expressed in the capability of the organism to
engage with its medium in terms of the signiﬁcance of a situa-
tion, thus contributing to its continuing dynamical autonomy
and even opening up the possibility of novel value-making.
However, this freedom is allowed by very strict and speciﬁc
material needs. It is a needful freedom.
Needful freedom severely constrains behavior, because viabil-
ity may never become zero. The organism should in fact always
aim to remain as viable as possible, because close to the viabil-
ity boundary (e.g., at birth or death) it has more pressing and
more speciﬁc material needs and is even more dependent on the
particulars of its immediate environment to satisfy its immediate
needs.
This suggests the need for two complementary sets of need
satisfaction strategies. One set to eﬀectively satisfy particular
material needs and another set to create the conditions in which
all needs can be satisﬁed as well as possible. Both strategies
give existential signiﬁcance – meaning – to the particulars of
the (immediate) environment. This process of meaning-giving
or sense-making forms the basis of the individual’s uniqueness,
because each individual exists in a (slightly) diﬀerent environ-
ment and must create a unique history of strategies to engage
it. This history of activities also provides the individual a unique
learning history to beneﬁt from.
Two Modes of Cognition
Within the enactive approach the terms ‘cognition’ and sense-
making are equated with autopoietic performance (Maturana
and Varela, 1991). For example Di Paolo and Thompson (2014)
conclude:
Cognition, in its most general form, is sense-making—the
adaptive regulation of states and interactions by an agent with
respect to the consequences for the agent’s own viability.
Within enactivism, cognition is not so much a function but
an ongoing process of sense-making: valuing the opportunities
of the environment in terms of contributions to an organism’s
continued existence. If at all possible, this cognitive process must
lead to the creation of conditions of sustained high viability due
to successful long-term need satisfaction.
This leads to a deﬁnition of cognitivity (Di Paolo and
Thompson, 2014):
A system is cognitive when its behavior is governed by the
norm of the system’s own continued existence and ﬂourishing.
This deﬁnition of cognitivity suggests two modes of cognition.
The ﬁrst mode is governed by “the norms of the agent’s contin-
ued existence” and corresponds to what we will refer to as the
‘coping mode of cognition’ because it is aimed at the satisfaction
of—pressing—‘deﬁciency needs.’ The second mode of cognition
is aimed at preventing pressing needs, while being “governed by
the norms of the agent’s ﬂourishing,” and will be referred to as the
‘co-creation mode of cognition.’
Cognitivity is deﬁned for the domain of complex systems
(Kauﬀman, 1995): systems characterized by many interacting
entities (Strevens, 2006), the absence of central control, and long-
term system inpredictability. The co-creation and the coping
mode have diﬀerent scopes and objectives that correspond to the
diﬀerence between ‘resilience’ and ‘stability.’
Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a
system and is ameasure of the ability of these systems to absorb
changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters,
and still persist. Stability, on the other hand, is the ability of
a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary
disturbance (Holling, 1973).
The resilience of a system leads to a persistence of relation-
ships that allow cognitive agents to rely on the overall dynamics
of that system. By enhancing beneﬁcial over detrimental rela-
tionships, the co-creation mode can set-up the conditions for its
continued existence and ﬂourishing. The scope of co-creaction is
therefore holistic, because it involves all aspects and all timescales
of agent and environment. The coping mode in contrast aims
for the return of particular equilibrium states in the agent (basic
need fulﬁlled) and its scope is limited to what is necessary for the
realization or maintainance of these stable states when required.
While the coping mode is ‘reactive,’ the co-creation mode of
cognition is ‘proactive.’
Resilience can be deﬁned at many levels of description and the
concept has many diﬀerent domain speciﬁc deﬁnitions (Brand
and Jax, 2007). In our case (a) the level of the individual – for
humans ego-resilience (Cohn et al., 2009) – and (b) the social
ecological system (Walker et al., 2004; Folke et al., 2010) it is
part of, are the most relevant. In particular, resilience as deﬁned
as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize
while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same
function, structure, identity, and feedbacks” (Walker et al., 2004)
is appropriate. Note that we could also refer to the co-creation
mode of cognition as “resilience build-up” or as ‘being cognition’
(Maslow, 1962, 1963), because it sets up the conditions for suc-
cessful ‘being.’ Equally the coping mode could have been referred
to as ‘deﬁciency cognition’ (Maslow, 1962, 1963).
Long Term Viability
The deﬁnition of cognitivity leads to a long-term viability mea-
sure: high quality autopoietic performance entails satisﬁed long-
term needs, while low quality autopoietic performance is appar-
ent as frequent or continually pressing immediate needs. The
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more a system is in the co-creation mode, the higher its viability
and vice versa. This quality measure is depicted in Figure 1.
Note that this is a quality measure related to well-being (in
terms of satisﬁed needs) and not directly to ﬁtness or evolution
(the theory of autopoiesis deﬁnes life, not the strategies life has
found to remain alive). However, it is safe to assume that high
well-being is conducive for the generation of healthy and pro-
creating oﬀspring. Also, the average lifespan of individuals who
regularly approach the boundary of their viability, i.e., are in
mortal danger, will be lower, just as their window to procreate.
Adaptivity and Sustainability
Both modes of cognition, coping, and co-creation, are concerned
with the prevention of an adverse future and are, as such, reﬂec-
tions of the essentially anticipatory nature of life (Vernon, 2010).
The main proponent of the central role of anticipation in biology
was Robert Rosen who deﬁned anticipatory systems as follows
(Louie, 2010):
An anticipatory system is a natural system that contains an
internal predictive model of itself and of its environment,
which allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the
model’s predictions pertaining to a later instant.
Cognition then relies on an internal predictive model (also
Vernon, 2010), involving the relations between self and environ-
ment, for the identiﬁcation of viability impacting likely future
states and the development of a decision strategy to select a
beneﬁcial future state while avoiding detrimental future ones.
This demand is covered by the term ‘adaptivity’ (Di Paolo,
2009) for, in particular, the coping mode of cognition of autopoi-
etic systems. Di Paolo deﬁnes adaptivity as follows:
Adaptivity: A system’s capacity, in some circumstances, to reg-
ulate its states and its relation to the environment with the
result that, if the states are suﬃciently close to the boundary
of viability,
FIGURE 1 | Long-term viability measure. The more prevalent the
co-creation mode, the higher autopoietic quality. The states on the right
correspond to thriving and the states on the left to withering.
(1) Tendencies are distinguished and acted upon depending
on whether the states will approach or recede from the
boundary and, as a consequence,
(2) Tendencies of the ﬁrst kind are moved closer to or trans-
formed into tendencies of the second and so future states
are prevented from reaching the boundary with an out-
ward velocity.
In this deﬁnition tendencies refer to likely futures. Interestingly,
this deﬁnition only distinguishes tendencies if they are suﬃciently
close to the boundary of viability, which suggests that adaptivity
is only needed in situations of immediate danger. However this
does not cover the conditions in which the system ﬂourishes.
By adding a third component to Di Paolo’s deﬁnition of adap-
tivity, the co-creation mode of cognition is also covered. This
leads, after a slight reformulation in italic, to a new concept that
we will call ‘sustainability’ (of self and the environment).
Sustainability: A system’s capacity, in some circumstances, to
regulate its states and its relation to the environment with the
result that
(1) Anticipation: Tendencies are distinguished and acted
upon depending on whether the states will approach or
recede from the boundary of viability.
(2) Coping: If the states are suﬃciently close to the boundary
of viability, tendencies of the ﬁrst kind are moved closer to
or transformed into tendencies of the second and so future
states are prevented from reaching the boundary with an
outward velocity.
(3) Co-creation: If the states are suﬃciently far from the bound-
ary of viability, tendencies of the second kind are used
to create an ever more spatially and temporally extended
environment for proactive need satisfaction.
Sustainability, deﬁned as such, complies with and even extends
the usual use of the term because it is a recipe not just to
conserve, but also to actually create, a stable and reliable eco-
logical dynamic. Applied to a global scale with overlapping and
structurally interwoven habitats, it implies the Gaia hypothesis
(Lovelock andMargulis, 1974), which proposes that all organisms
and their inorganic surroundings on Earth are closely integrated
to form a single self-regulating complex system that maintains
the conditions for life on the planet (i.e., life itself sets up the
conditions for its proactive need satisfaction). This dovetails with
Margulis and Sagan (1995) who wrote:
“Darwin’s grand vision was not wrong, only incomplete. In accen-
tuating the direct competition between individuals for resources
as the primary selection mechanism, Darwin (and especially his
followers) created the impression that the environment was sim-
ply a static arena.”
Indeed, the competition (coping mode) takes place in a com-
plex environment continually maintained and co-created by life
for its own beneﬁt (co-creation mode).
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The three aspects of the deﬁnition of sustainability –
anticipation, coping, and co-creation – deserve some more
attention.
Anticipation: Original Perspective
Any agent develops a history of activities by which it is at any
instant constrained, so it always builds on its earlier activities.
Or put diﬀerently: it is for better or for worse, always confronted
with the consequences of its own actions. By selecting its activities
well, i.e., timing its behaviors well, the agent can, at least for some
time, avoid states it cannot handle and select or co-create states
that allow it to thrive. Consequently, the anticipatory nature of
successful autopoiesis requires the prediction of possible viabil-
ity developments through some model of itself in relation to the
environment.
Since the simplest predictive model is only based on the aggre-
gate of internal and external states, the earliest perception-action
models were based on the aggregate of internal and external inﬂu-
ences and were therefore unable to separate these. On top of this
“holistic” evaluationmore advanced perceptual mechanisms have
evolved that, eventually, could separate internal from external
inﬂuences (including inﬂuences from other agents). One essen-
tial property of this ‘original perspective’ is that it is holistic and
context sensitive. This theoretical consideration will be applied a
number of times in the rest of this paper.
The original perspective was not only holistic and context sen-
sitive, but also essentially subjective: it was both individual and
deeply value-laden in terms of whether it reﬂected tendencies
that approach or recede from the individual boundary of via-
bility. This can be interpreted as a perspective on the safety of
the individual that it in part should learn through exploration
(a form of participation in the environment). The development
and initiation of appropriate (tendency transforming) activities
depend therefore on the individual’s history and are unique for
the individual.
This (again) entails that each individual is its own sense-maker
in terms of how it interprets tendencies as beneﬁcial (good), detri-
mental (bad), or irrelevant, depending on whether they recede or
approach the boundaries of viability. Yet, although each individ-
ual is its own sense-maker, it is also a member of a species and it
shares many essential aspects with other life forms, entailing the
existence of general sense-making strategies. These commonali-
ties form the basis for morality deﬁned as “the extent to which an
action is right or wrong” (New Oxford Dictionary) on which we
will build.
Coping
In situations that are experienced as indicative of immanent dan-
ger of viability loss, the agent is confronted with one or more
unsatisﬁed needs as pressing problems to address; even if this
goes at the cost of other aspects that are currently not critical. The
coping mode prioritizes and as a result is focused and sequential.
Coping favors the certainty of control over improvisation and as
such the autopoietic system will tend to keep or bring all essential
parameters within the bounds of normal functioning, using what-
ever reliable utility (in- or external) it has access to. This entails
that the coping mode of cognition is essentially conservative: to
protect the essential, it will sacriﬁce the unessential and/or cur-
rently worthless as an inevitable side eﬀect. Concepts that aptly
describe the functioning of the coping mode are ‘trying to control
the situation,’ ‘reactive problem solving,’ ‘prioritizing,’ ‘conserva-
tion of the essential,’ ‘short-term utility for self-preservation,’ and
‘acceptance of adverse side eﬀects.’
Following Di Paolo’s (2009) ‘adaptivity,’ life on earth started as
a perpetual “reactive struggle” that could only exist in the most
favorable conditions. Life could become only stable and com-
fortably established when the aggregate of living individuals suc-
ceeded in proactively co-creating and maintaining—eventually
earth-wide—the conditions for their own existence: life extended
‘adaptivity’ to ‘sustainability.’ This line of reasoning suggests that
the coping mode has older evolutionary origins and that the co-
creation mode evolved as a safer strategy by ever-expanding the
“scope of normality.”
Co-creation
The need to activate the coping mode is indicative of a failing or
inadequacy of the co-creation mode. Apparently the agent failed,
through its own fault or not, in proactively maintaining a situ-
ation without pressing needs, which forced the coping mode to
reactively solve the problem. Since the coping mode of cognition
is essentially a fallback in case of a failing co-creation mode—with
the ultimate objective to preserve agency or life by conserving the
essential at the cost of the currently not essential and bringing
it back within the scope of normality—the core task of the co-
creation mode is to restore the overall functioning of the system,
and to consolidate the whole system after insult.
After the autopoietic system has consolidated itself and is fully
viable again, the priority shifts back to co-creation to prevent
new insults or to come up with ways to mitigate their eﬀects
proactively to optimize the long-term viability of the autopoi-
etic system in its environment. Thus the co-creation mode builds
on the holistic and context sensitivity of the original perspective.
Concepts that describe the co-creation mode are ‘prevention of
problems,’ ‘holistic optimization,’ ‘context sensitivity,’ ‘consolida-
tion after repletion,’ and – as much as possible – the ‘creating and
maintaining of a safe and sustaining environment with long-term
beneﬁts.’
This suggests a way to introduce concepts like ‘good’ and ‘bad’
in terms of resilience. A ‘good’ inﬂuence increases “the capacity
of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing
change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure,
identity, and feedback” (Walker et al., 2004) while a ‘bad’ inﬂuence
erodes, or in extreme cases destroys, this capacity. In fact we can
call tendencies that move agents to the left in Figure 1 ‘bad’ and
tendencies to the right ‘good.’ Note that what is good for a system
deﬁned on one aggregation level can be bad on another (and the
same with short and long term).
Summary of Cognition from Life
The subsection above discussed that a living agent decides, in
part, on its own future via behavior that selects advantageous
reachable future states according to its own norms and on the
basis of some sort of predictive model that optimizes future
viability. Cognition boils down to the selection and execution
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of activities promoting the individual’s continued existence and
ﬂourishing, which encapsulates the enactive approach as “being
by doing” (Froese and Ziemke, 2009). We propose two modes
of cognition: a coping mode of cognition focused on keeping a
living agent in mere existence, and a co-creation mode of cogni-
tion focused on the ﬂourishing of a living agent. Together, we will
refer to these two modes and the concept that emerge from them
as ‘core cognition.’
Figure 2 represents a visual summary (concept map) of ‘core
cognition.’ The deﬁnition of sustainability is the “starting point”
(top-middle). From there contrasting, but not necessarily similar
or complementary, consequences of coping (left) and co-creation
(right) branch out to the side and below. Both the concepts
‘agency’ and ‘Umwelt’ are common for the two modes. The
concepts in the lower square (‘authority,’ ‘intelligence,’ ‘under-
standing,’ ‘power,’ and ‘wisdom’) are typically attributed to human
cognition and emerge quite naturally and without the need for
intermediate steps or levels, which will be discussed in Section
“Human Cognition from Life.”
Unicellular Cooperation Virtues
In this section, we remain at the unicellular level, but unlike
Section “Cognition from Life” we focus on relations between indi-
vidual living agents. In particular we address cooperation from
the viewpoint of the coping and the co-creation mode. We ﬁrst
discuss the need for cooperation, then the resulting group per-
spective, and ﬁnally a number of unicellular cooperation virtues.
We will compare these virtues with human moral values in
Section “Haidt’s Moral Virtues.”
Unicellular Cooperation
One essential activity of living agents with important conse-
quences is procreation. Unicellular organisms procreate by divid-
ing and thus end up as neighboring individuals. After a number of
generations in favorable situations – conditions in which all needs
are satisﬁed and therefore indicative of the co-creation mode
– this results in many individuals in overlapping habitats. This
success leads, inevitably, to problems associated with the autopoi-
etic demands for material throughput: a growing demand (per
volume) for nutrients and energy andmore waste products to dis-
pose of. Yet, it makes cooperation possible. Sociality is therefore
both a challenge and an opportunity for life and as such it oﬀers
the possibility for a self-stabilizing dynamic.
As stated before, the predictive models of the most primitive
unicellular life forms are holistic and unable to separate in- and
external states. Individuals of early life forms based activities on
holistic predictive models that account for the state of the individ-
ual in its environment (whether social or not). As a consequence,
sociality does not require qualitative diﬀerent decision processes
compared to “individual-level decisions.” As long as the predic-
tive model can learn to select advantageous strategies, given the
environment, it will serve the individuals (and the species alike).
However, what is advantageous diﬀers between the co-creation
and the coping mode. The co-creation mode favors preven-
tion of problems, consolidation after repletion, and the creation
and maintenance of a safe and sustaining environment with
long-term beneﬁts. In contrast, the copingmode involves increas-
ing control over the situation, to prevent one from becoming
an inadequate or even dead agent. The coping agent does this
through conservation of the essential, exploiting short-term util-
ity for self-preservation, and ignoring or accepting adverse side
eﬀects in the course of pressing need satisfaction.
Based on the composition one can imagine three types of
groups: all resilient, all coping, or a mixture of individuals in the
co-creation and the coping mode. When all individuals are in
the co-creation mode (which might not often be realistic) this
can result in a combination of cooperation and individual or
group-wise exploration with the creation and maintenance of an
environment that is as safe and sustaining as possible. If, however,
all individuals are in the coping mode, this may lead to a relentless
competition between opportunistic individuals with as conse-
quence the survival of the “ﬁttest” (actually the survival of those
that cope/compete best given the environment). Or alternatively,
they can cooperate conform the strengths of the coping mode and
engage in highly regimented behaviors that may be very eﬀec-
tive in addressing the (now) shared needs. However, unlike the
co-creation mode this behavior is not necessarily without adverse
side eﬀects.
In situations with individuals in both modes, the balance
between cooperation and self-enhancing beneﬁts determines the
outcome. For example, Cremer et al. (2012) observes a typical
three phase repetitive cycle of bacterial population dynamics.
The cycle starts with relatively few and independent bacterial
cells that do not procreate. In procreation promoting condi-
tions, individuals form groups according to chance. These groups
develop diﬀerently according to the fraction of individuals more
inclined to the coping mode – who focus on pressing need sat-
isfaction and who Cremer refers to as cheaters or defectors –
versus those in the co-creation mode – who optimize the aggre-
gate of self and the environment (cooperators). Cremer et al.
(2012) observes two characteristic features of the groups’ internal
dynamics:
“First because of the costs for providing the beneﬁt, cooperators
have a selection disadvantage, compared to cheaters in the same
group. In particular, cooperators reproduce slower than cheaters
and hence the fraction of cooperators decreases within each group
(intra-group evolution). Second, considering the beneﬁt of coop-
eration, groups with more cooperators grow faster and can reach
a higher maximum size (carrying capacity) than groups of mainly
cheaters (inter-group evolution).”
The moment the conditions for growth are no longer main-
tained, the groups dissolve and the individuals become again
more independent, but now in new numbers of cheaters and
cooperators.
We can conclude that for individuals in the co-creation mode
it is highly beneﬁcial to have as many others as possible in the
co-creation mode as well, which implies that if coping is not
dominant, a community of individuals can thrive. This entails
that ‘caring’ behavior, which helps individuals shift from the
coping mode into the co-creation mode, is a viable tactic in
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the co-creation mode to eﬀectively promote overall thriving.
Conversely when coping becomes dominant, thriving becomes
increasingly rare. This is a rephrasing of the long-term viability
measure (Figure 1), but now on a group level.
This example illustrates the key characteristics of the coping
and the co-creation mode. The coping mode might favor unsus-
tainable forms of cooperation, such as competition at the cost of,
for example, fellow individuals who compete less well. The co-
creation mode on the other hand realizes global beneﬁts in the
form of a higher carrying capacity. Both strategies have evolution-
ary advantages: the coping mode in times of adversity, in which a
reduction of the number of individuals is actually beneﬁcial given
limited resources, and resilience enhancement (co-creation) in
times of plenty. However, not all individuals maymake the switch
from one mode to the other at the same time and some may be
more inclined to one particular strategy. Nonetheless individuals
in diﬀerentmodes exhibiting quite diﬀerent strategies can coexist.
The Emergent Group Perspective
Cooperation leads to the emergence of group-level agency and
with that to the emergence of group-level meaning giving and
sense-making. It also leads to a group-perspective in addition
to the perspective of each individual. Without cooperation, the
associated perspective is that of the unicellular individuals and
behavior is selected from the set of all reachable future states
per individual. A cooperating group creates a new perspective
in which behavior is selected from all reachable future states of
that group, which might be quite diﬀerent and, at times, even
conﬂicting with the demands at the unicellular level.
In particular the cooperative perspective creates an aggre-
gate or group level to which one can ascribe the coping and
co-creation mode. For example
“myxobacteria are Gram-negative organisms that are capable of
multicellular, social behavior. In the presence of nutrients, swarms
of myxobacteria feed cooperatively by sharing extracellular diges-
tive enzymes, and can prey on other bacteria. When the food
supply runs low, they initiate a complex developmental program
that culminates in the production of a fruiting body”
(Kaiser, 2003).
In this case the bacteria start with a kind of loose cooperation
(allowing for a diversity of individual activities) of independent
agents in times of plenty – a group level co-creation mode –
that develops into a highly regimented (uniform, predictable,
and coordinated) and eventually even sacriﬁcial collaboration to
produce the spores that continue the species elsewhere at a later
stage – a group level coping mode.
This suggests that in the co-creation mode individuals have
maximal agency and freedom to pursue individual or collective
futures, which may lead to the discovery of ever more versatile
cooperative or individual strategies that progressively bring more
and more situations within the scope of the co-creation mode.
The group level coping mode results into individuals trading
“freedom for security” and engaging in highly regimented behav-
iors with particular need satisfaction purposes such as “accessing
resources that cannot eﬀectively be utilized by single cells, collec-
tively defending against antagonists, and optimizing population
survival” (Shapiro, 1998).
Unicellular Cooperation Virtues
The factors that deﬁne the actual form of cooperation depend
essentially on the scope of the cooperation beneﬁts (for some
ingroup or for all) and the degree to which the needs are press-
ing. A cooperating agent in the co-creation mode should not
only maintain its internal network, but it must take the needs
of its collaborators, as well as the overall state of the environ-
ment, into account. This quite naturally leads to a basic concern –
a care – for a general well-being, including the capacity to pre-
vent harming others, assist the suﬀering, and a concern for the
shared environment (which it can because it is based on a holistic
evaluation).
The “caring agent” will be sensitive to the needs of others
and in particular be concerned about suﬃcient ‘need satisfac-
tion equality’ among individuals in its Umwelt since ‘unfulﬁlled
need inequality’ leads to diversity in behavioral strategies (co-
creation versus coping) and as such to the undermining of
(long-term) collaborative eﬀorts and overall (group-level) sta-
bility. Strategies involving a shared care for a fair distribution
of fulﬁlled (and unfulﬁlled) needs are highly self-stabilizing and
resilience enhancing, while at the same time allowing for the
discovery of new dynamically stable states.
Note that the scope of need satisfaction may not only involve
ones own species, but in principle all living agents who contribute
to the holistic situational awareness – Umwelt – on which action
selection is based. These strategies are examples of the co-creation
mode and may even underlie the emergence of Gaia as the global
self-sustaining network of living entities that created and main-
tained the atmosphere and biosphere it relies on for its continued
existence (Lovelock and Margulis, 1974).
The aggregate situational awareness characteristic of the ﬁrst
life forms are likely to be conserved according to the constraints
imposed by the Rule of Conservative Changes. If so, this could
be a basis for empathy (according to the New Oxford Dictionary
“the ability to understand and share the feelings of another”):
however, not limited to conspeciﬁcs, but conforming with the
breadth of the holistic situational awareness, toward to the whole
Umwelt. Empathy might therefore be understood in its origi-
nal form as “the ability to understand and be inﬂuenced by the
state of the whole environment.” We will return to the concept of
‘understanding’ in a later section, where we deﬁne it.
Yet not all collaborative strategies may, in principle, be
broadly beneﬁcial. Some may explicitly promote the satisfaction
of particular ingroup needs to the detriment of other groups or
individuals and the strategies are examples of the coping mode.
Coping strategies need a clear ingroup/outgroup distinction so
that ingroup members are recognizable, loyal, and willing to dis-
regard or exploit outgroups. In addition all group members are
expected to identify and execute group roles properly (and with-
out error). Finally, ingroup cooperation requires the behavior of
all group members to be constrained by ingroup level rational-
ity. In particular behaviors that stem from individual-level needs
(i.e., make sense from rationality constraints at the level of the
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individual) should be resisted if they exceed group-level norms
or lead to group-level costs.
These behaviors give rise to two qualitatively diﬀerent sets of
standards of conduct for ‘cooperation virtues.’ The ﬁrst set allows
for broadly beneﬁcial, i.e., global, cooperation through a care for
all agents and their needs in the environment in combination
with eﬀorts to realize a by and large equal, or fair, distribution
of satisﬁed needs. The second set of standards allows for eﬀective
within-group dynamics and even competition between in- and
outgroups. In this mode, ingroup loyalty, ingroup role adherence,
and ingroup-level rationality constraints on individual behavior
are central. Table 1 summarizes these group-level cooperation
values.
Cooperation and Agency
In the co-creation mode, social individuals have maximal agency
and freedom to pursue individual or collective future as long
as they are, at the same time, sensitive and responsive to the
needs of other agents in their Umwelt and promote more or less
equal levels of need satisfaction. Within these bounds this mode
may lead to the discovery of ever more versatile individual and
cooperative strategies that progressively bring more andmore sit-
uations within the scope of the co-creation mode and in doing so
increases the carrying capacity of the environment. This results
in widely shared beneﬁts and the generation of evermore stable,
reliable, and beneﬁcial nested relationships between individuals,
species, habitats, and even the global eco-system. In short: broad
resilience built-up. A general state of thriving is the hallmark of
the success of the co-creation mode. This form or cooperation
relies essentially on individual-level agency as a resource.
In the coping mode (e.g., when food supply runs low) social
individuals may choose to trade “freedom for security” in which
they engage in highly regimented collaborative behavior with a
particular need satisfaction purpose and particular stable states.
This formofcooperation treats individual level agencyasa stability
threat that should be curtailed instead of stimulated. In this mode
individuals treat the environment as a resource and a buﬀer of
utilities to be exploited. More constructively, it can also lead to
a particular form of constructive cooperation intended to beneﬁt
the ingroup (possibly at the costs of outgroups). This form of
cooperationreliesessentiallyoningroup-levelagencyasaresource.
For later reference, the previous can be summarized as follows:
Global versus Local Optimization Caring for all (global) ver-
sus caring for oneself or for a particular ingroup (local) relates
directly to cognitive modes that drive behavior and thus deter-
mine the type of cooperation. Agents in the co-creation mode
engage in long-term optimization of the opportunities and
dynamic stability – resilience – of the combination between self
and the environment. Their cooperation, involves all agents
in the context of their Umwelt. To do so cooperating indi-
viduals should be generally caring and promoting equality of
need satisfaction levels. On the other hand, unsatisﬁed needs
and inequality in need satisfaction levels promote a prevalence
and diversity of individuals in the coping mode. These are
motivated by short-term, small-scope, ingroup, and situation
speciﬁc goals.
We will return to this summary in the next section when we
address moral virtues.
Human Cognition from Life
As we suggested in the Introduction, we will now skip a few
billion years and scale-up the number of cells of the organ-
ism by 14 orders of magnitude. We assume, on the basis of the
Rule of Conservative Changes, that nothing fundamental (“essen-
tial”) has changed, entailing that both unicellular and human
behavior can be described by the two cognitive modes, i.e., the
coping and co-creation mode that deﬁne core cognition. In this
section we substantiate this, at ﬁrst glance quite extraordinary
TABLE 1 | Cooperation virtues formulated from unicellular level cognition.
Scope of optimization
Cognitive mode
Cooperation virtue Description
Global – long term
Co-creating and maintaining
conditions for pervasive need
satisfaction
Co-creation mode
1 – Care Concern and shared responsibility for the need satisfaction in others in particular through
preventing harm in others, assisting those in need, and care for the environment in general
(promoting the co-creation mode).
2 – Fairness Promotion of equality in terms of the level of satisfied needs to prevent a diversity of unsatisfied
needs (preventing the coping mode).
Local – short term
Creating and maintaining
conditions suitable for effective
ingroup coping
3 – Ingroup loyalty Showing/proving you are a member of the ingroup through signification, self-sacrifice, ingroup
loyalty, and disregard or exploitation of outgroups.
4 – Ingroup role adherence Proper identification and execution of ingroup roles and norms (prevention of mistakes),
submission to ingroup consensus, or a central coordinating center.
Coping mode 5 – Ingroup rationality constraints Self imposed limits on behavior according to ingroup-level rationality. For example resistance to
pursue individual-level selfish needs that exceed ingroup norms or tempt others to exceed
ingroup constraints as well.
This table can be compared to the Table 2 (Haidt’s moral values).
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prediction, with ﬁve examples of well-known phenomena and
theories reported in modern psychology that all pertain in some
way to “the capacity to live life to the beneﬁts of self and others.”
We consider these clear examples of modern day manifes-
tations of core cognition (the upper part of Figure 2) and in
particular of the long-term viability measure (Figure 1), the
co-creation and coping mode, and unicellular level cooperation
virtues (Table 1). The given examples build on each other and
are intimately related because they are manifestations of core
cognition. We will address:
(1) The bihemispheric structure of the brain (McGilchrist, 2010)
implementing two attitudes toward a complex world.
(2) Dual type processing in relation to the coping and the co-
creation mode.
(3) The derivation of the concepts of ‘intelligence’ and ‘power’
from the properties of the coping mode and the concepts of
‘understanding’ and ‘wisdom’ from the co-creation mode.
(4) The interpretation of the structure of human (strictly speak-
ing American) moral values as straightforward extension of
unicellular cooperation values (Haidt and Graham, 2007).
(5) The broaden and build theory of positive emotions
(Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005; Cohn et al., 2009) reﬂect-
ing key properties of the co-creation mode.
In a recent paper called “Learning autonomy in two or three
steps: linking open-ended development, authority, and agency
to motivation” (Andringa et al., 2013), we already combined
many of the key concepts in these ﬁve examples. The Learning
Autonomy paper focused on the development of human cogni-
tion and autonomy during a life span (ontogenesis). The present
paper addresses the evolution of cooperative behaviors of individ-
uals in groups, and groups in an environment (the phylogenesis
of behavior). The present paper thus allows us to understand why
the concepts emerged in Learning Autonomy the way they did.
We will refer a number of times to that paper. Together – com-
bining ontogenesis and phylogenesis – these two papers bolster
our claims even further.
Note that we cannot really proof our prediction. What we
aim for is to show the existence of a high degree of consistency
between unicellular level cognition – core cognition – and results
from modern Psychology. Consistency and similarity, even to
an uncanny level, are indicative but not conclusive proof of the
prediction that since the stable emergence of life nothing essential
has changed and thus that the deﬁnition of life already contained
the determinants of cognition. So, for the moment, it is not proof
but plausibility we aim for.
Example 1: Two Attitudes Toward the World
and Two Brain Hemispheres
In Learning Autonomy (Andringa et al., 2013) we observed that
successful life span development is characterized by an ever-
improving understanding of reality in combination with an urge
(and proven ability) to improve and shape the Umwelt. This ﬁts
the description of the co-creation mode that we coupled to the
“prevention of problems, consolidation after repletion, and – as
much as possible – the creation and maintenance of a safe and
sustaining environment with long-term need satisfaction poten-
tial.” In Learning Autonomy we interpreted cognitive develop-
ment (in humans and human-like artiﬁcial agents) as learning to
master the complexity of the world.
Life is always near the ‘edge of chaos’ (Mora and Bialek, 2011)
and if the complexity of the current situation is judged too high
we beneﬁt from coping strategies that reduce its complexity and
make the situation more tractable and predictable. In Learning
Autonomy we referred to the form of cognition that allows us
to curtail a complex world as “cognition for order,” “cognition
for certainty,” or “control cognition.” We associated this form
of cognition with fear and anxiety, detachment, abstract manip-
ulation, and the personality trait ‘closed to experience.’ This
description matches with the concepts that we used to describe
the coping mode: ‘trying to control the situation,’ ‘reactive prob-
lem solving,’ ‘conservation of the essential,’ ‘short-term utility for
self-preservation,’ and ‘acceptance of adverse side eﬀects.’
Yet at other moments we can deal with some additional com-
plexity and allow ourselves to explore the possibilities of the
world. Successful, typically playful and purposeless, exploration
leads to the discovery of new, generic or invariant structures that
make the world a bit more tractable and accessible to agentic
inﬂuences. This expansion of the understanding of the world ﬁts
with the holistic nature of the co-creation mode.
In Learning Autonomy we observed that the two modes we
identiﬁed matched the description of diﬀerences in the way the
left and right cerebral hemispheres understand the world and
contribute to our existence according to the seminal work “The
Master and His Emissary” by McGilchrist (2010). Table 1 of
Learning Autonomy provides an comprehensive summary of the
reported diﬀerences between (and complementarity of) the atti-
tudes toward the world associated with the left and the right
hemispheres that exempliﬁes how the coping and the co-creation
modes are implemented in modern humanity (and in particular
the brains of human individuals).
McGilchrist (2010) argues that our Western societies have
become characterized by an ever growing dominance of the left-
hemispheric – coping – world-view that favors a narrow focus
over the broader picture, specialists over generalists, fragmen-
tation over uniﬁcation, knowledge and intelligence over experi-
ence and wisdom, technical objects over living entities, control
over growth and ﬂourishing, and dependence over autonomy.
Apparently, despite the huge cultural progress that has beenmade
in the last millennia, humanity shifted more and more toward
the coping mode. According to the summary in Figure 1 this
is a neither a sign of autopoietic success, nor of viability: on
the contrary. Apparently, our understanding of society has not
matched society’s complexity growth.
This erosion of the co-creation mode of cognition, and,
directly coupled, the resilience reduction of our natural envi-
ronment, may in fact explain why humanity faces a number of
existential problems and in particular has diﬃculties in realizing
a sustainable long-term future: the coping mode, with a focus on
pressing problems, intolerance to diversity, and its insensitivity
to adverse side-eﬀects as key characteristics, is simply unsuit-
able to setup the conditions for easy and reliable future need
satisfaction.
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Example 2: Dual Type Processing
The previous section may have suggested that the coping mode
is an inferior mode of cognition that is mainly useful in situa-
tions where the co-creation mode is inadequate and long-term
adverse side eﬀects are the least of one’s worries. On a long-term
strategic level this may be true, but in the short-term of dailymen-
tal processes we propose that the interplay between both modes
allows ever-improving action selection. We do this by connecting
to dual-process theories of higher cognition.
Dual-process or dual system theories of higher cognition
(Evans, 2003; Evans and Stanovich, 2013) rely on the existence
of two qualitatively diﬀerent systems that, together, span the full
scope of mental processes. These theories are still under devel-
opment and not without criticism (Keren and Schul, 2009), yet
they easily ﬁt in our discourse. In a recent paper addressing this
criticism Evans and Stanovich (2013) separate deﬁning and cor-
relative features of two types of mental processes (that each may
have hemispheric biases, but that are deﬁnitely not exclusively
associated with a single hemisphere).
According to Evans and Stanovich (2013) the deﬁning proper-
ties of type 1 – intuitive – processes are that they are autonomous
and do not require working memory, while type 2 – reﬂective –
processes do require working memory and allow for cogni-
tive decoupling from the here and now to allow “hypothetical
reasoning and cognitive simulation” (Stanovich et al., 2011).
We summarized the Section “Cognition from Life” with the
following conclusion about living agency:
A living agent decides, in part, on its own future via behavior
that selects advantageous future states (of the aggregate of self and
environment)—from the set of all reachable future states the agent
has access to—according to its own norms and on the basis of
some sort of predictive model that optimizes its future viability.
We propose that an intricate interplay between type 1 and 2
processes, a few billion years later, implements this. Type 1 pro-
cesses bring and keep the agent autonomously—without central
control – from the set of all possible states of reality into amindset
appropriate for the here-and-now. This mindset presents reality
(McGilchrist, 2010; Andringa et al., 2013, Table 1) and especially
its most salient and potentially meaningful or otherwise pressing
aspects as Umwelt. Type 1 processes set up the stage for all action
selection and are a manifestation of the original (holistic) per-
spective. Automatic behaviors like walking or habits like brushing
your teeth rely on the autonomy and situational awareness of type
1 processing. We have partial conscious access to the outcomes
of type 1 processes as a holistic experience (Kaplan, 1995), direct
perception (Gibson, 1986), or as gist phenomena (Oliva, 2005).
Type 2 processes take the generated Umwelt as basis for
non-automatic and non-habitual action selection to propose an
even more beneﬁcial future than automated or habitual, type 1,
responses can realize. This more complex action selection pro-
cess involves the comparison of viability beneﬁts of multiple
scenarios as an outcome of hypothetical reasoning and cogni-
tive simulation. In fact, “we create temporary models of the
world and test out actions (or alternative causes) in that sim-
ulated world” (Stanovich et al., 2011) by harnessing knowledge
abstracted from previous experiences. Since type 1 processes are
more or less conﬁned to the here and now, type 2 processes need
an independent structure to “decouple” (Stanovich et al., 2011)
from it. Apparently working memory provides this simulation
infrastructure.
In the Section, “TwoModes of Cognition,” we coupled the key
diﬀerences of the co-creation and coping modes to the diﬀerence
between ‘resilience’ and ‘stability.’ Reapplying this notion here
suggests that type 1 processes use the resilience of the “generated”
Umwelt as a quality measure so that increasingly resilient bene-
ﬁcial properties of the Umwelt are suggestive of desirable action
outcomes. Similarly type 2 processes search for particular forms
of stability and predictability; for example through discovering
phenomena and their properties across many manifestations of
the Umwelt.
Type 1 processes provide us with a rough sense of where we
are, what is going on, and which acts will enhance or deterio-
rate the resilience of key components of the environment. Type
2 processes are the basis for explicit knowledge; in particular
knowledge about the many interacting agents and processes that
shape and deﬁne the Umwelt, its dynamics, and, via our acts, the
world. By activating particular type 2 knowledge conﬁgurations
as abstracted hypotheses of simulated Umwelt states, which feed
back to type 1 processes as self-generated “input,” type 1 processes
can associate resilience estimates. In fact it seems that the brain
has an infrastructure for this that switches between sensory and
self-generated “input” (Buckner et al., 2008).
Type 2 processing has been shown to correlate with general
intelligence, while type 1 processing does not ( Evans et al., 2010;
Evans and Stanovich, 2013). We propose that ‘understanding’ is
associated with the ability of type 1 processes to predict resilience
eﬀects: a new concept is ‘understood’ if its resilience eﬀects can be
predicted in an open world. One understands the world deeply if
one can use the resilience and fragility in the world to reliable
select actions that contribute to a favorable future.
This general description allows us to argue that a number
of phenomena from diﬀerent domains of psychology are actu-
ally manifestations of the interplay of type 1 and 2 processes
as deﬁned above. For example experiments addressing the time
course of visual perception (Greene and Oliva, 2009) indicate
that general, often action-selection related, landscape properties
such as naturalness, depth, possibilities for concealment, and nav-
igability can be estimated from a shorter image exposure than
basic-level categorizations like forest, mountain, desert, and lake.
We interpret this as type 1 processes setting up the stage for
action selection and are therefore aimed at the activation of a sit-
uationally appropriate action repertoire through answering the
questions “Where am I?” and “What is my default response?”
Consecutively, type 2 processes augment this with knowledge
abstracted across many diﬀerent previous situations to interpret
the situation better and to propose “better than default responses”
back to type 1 processes for appraisal and comparison with
expected sensory details.
A very similar account, at a longer timescale, can be formu-
lated for emotion research, considering the common deﬁnition of
emotion as ‘action readiness’ (Frijda, 1986). Emotion researchers
make a diﬀerence between basic and complex emotions, where
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basic emotion arises directly as action readiness from the inter-
play between body and sensory stimulation (Izard, 2007). In
contrast, complex emotions like emotional schemas “are deﬁned
in terms of the dynamic interaction of emotion and cognition”
and “diﬀer across individuals and cultures” (Izard, 2007). As such
the actions they give rise to are not innate but learned from expe-
rience or imitation and thus they may represent vast amounts of
tacit knowledge. Directly related to this distinction is the process
of ‘emotion regulation’ (Gross and Thompson, 2007) in which
deliberative processes change an initial emotion/action readiness
into another more appropriate form. Both complex emotions
and emotion regulation depend on the interplay between type
1 situational awareness, type 2 proposals for better than default
outcomes, and type 1 evaluations of these proposals.
A third and last example involves mind wandering. It seems
that people spend between 25 and 50% of their waking hours
on thoughts unrelated to the here and now (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2015). The ‘default mode network,’ directly associated
with mindwandering, seems a fundamental function of the mam-
malian brain (Lu et al., 2012). “In the absence of an immediate
need for goal-directed attention to the surrounding environment,
our minds wander from recollection of past happenings to imag-
ination of future events (Lu et al., 2012).” This can be interpreted
as: when not in the coping mode, the mind wanders according
to the dynamics of the co-creation mode (type 1), allowing the
sequential reasoning about possibilities by type 2 processing, and
performing resilience appraisal of these possibilities by type 1
responses.
The reported functions of mind wandering include prospec-
tion through simulating future activities, creativity via testing
new solutions or perspectives, developing a meaningful life nar-
rative, allowing for mental breaks, and to provide similar func-
tions as dreaming (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). A more
abstract function, spanning decades and probably encompassing
all reported functions, is the optimization of thought outcomes.
Mind wandering, through its random nature, can be used to
revisit, examine, and if need be improve, all knowledge and
skills of a living agent and in doing so gradually upgrade one’s
unexamined and more or less accidentally acquired ‘mental con-
tent 1.0,’ into a critically examined more empowering ‘mental
content 2.0.’ This is what Perry (1998) describes as a key feature of
the liberally educated mind and Van Rossum and Hamer (2010)
mean by crossing the epistemological ‘watershed.’ Whatever it is
called: it contributes, most eﬀectively, to the agentic essence of
optimizing future long-term viability through improved action
selection.
Example 3: Intelligence and Power versus
Understanding and Wisdom
The concept of ‘understanding’ has emerged a number of times
in this paper. Interestingly, well-developed understanding was
always associated with the co-creation mode. Apparently well-
developed understanding is not characteristic for the coping
mode of cognition. However, due to the coping mode’s focus on
the solution or mitigation of pressing problems, the concept of
‘intelligence’ is deﬁnitely a key feature of the coping mode of cog-
nition. Well-developed intelligence, as measured by an IQ-test,
reﬂects the capacity to solve problems with known and ﬁxed out-
comes (which are therefore closed-world problems). This leads to
the supposition that ‘intelligence’ manifests itself as the ability
to solve or otherwise address pressing problems within a speciﬁc
known domain.
In contrast, well-developed ‘understanding’ should, conform-
ing with the logic of the co-creation mode, manifest itself as
the ability to create, maintain, and inﬂuence many aspects of
one’s habitat with pervasive and long term ﬂourishing as objec-
tive and measure-of-success. Unlike intelligence, understanding
is an open-world competence. Where intelligence is ideal for
problem solving in known, ﬁxed, and bounded contexts, under-
standing develops as one learns to grasp the general and invariant
structures of unconstrained reality.
Coping is not only about solving problems, it is also about
preventing an ill-understood world from spinning out of con-
trol, i.e., making it more stable and predictable. It is therefore
about “the ability to produce intended outcomes”: the deﬁni-
tion of ‘power’ as proposed by Bertrand Russell (Russell, 1938).
In Learning Autonomy, we summarized Sternberg’s (1998) def-
inition of wisdom as “the ability to produce broadly beneﬁcial
desired results while taking the full consequences of behavior on
the habitat into account.” This suggests, in the context of this
paper, to deﬁne power as “the ability to produce speciﬁc (often
complexity reducing) intended results in a certain bounded envi-
ronment without taking the full consequences of behavior into
account.”
This then leads to two sets of concepts pertaining to the core
cognitive processes related to how individuals create, maintain,
or inﬂuence their habitat, i.e., how authoritative they are as indi-
viduals (Andringa et al., 2013). The set associated with the coping
mode is deﬁciency or need driven and aims to exploit (to sat-
isfy a pressing need) or to control (to reduce the complexity) the
environment. In this mode ‘being authoritative’ means ‘exercis-
ing power’ and its key cognitive ability is ‘intelligence.’ The set
associated with the co-creation mode is about the creation of a
future in which it is easy to satisfy needs and as such it aims, via
participation in, discovery of, using, promoting, relying on, and
dynamically stabilizing the inherent dynamics of, the Umwelt in
ways that maximize ‘resilience.’ In this mode ‘being authoritative’
equals being ‘wise,’ which requires a deep and pervasive under-
standing of the self and the Umwelt, manifested as the ability to
produce broadly beneﬁcial long-term results.
The lower block in Figure 2 visualizes the relations between
these concepts. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that core
concepts of (human) cognition are deﬁned from ﬁrst princi-
ples (namely ‘sustainability’ as deﬁning property of life). That
the terms ‘understanding’ and to a lesser extend ‘wisdom’ have
received little scientiﬁc attention compared to ‘intelligence’ and
‘power’ is probably another sign of modern days’ narrow – coping
mode associated – focus.
Example 4: Haidt’s Moral Virtues
Haidt and Graham (2007) wrote a well-known article with the
title “WhenMorality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral
Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize.” They argue that in
the USA liberals typically recognize care (e.g., harm–prevention),
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and fairness as two key moral concerns. But, according to Haidt
and Graham (2007):
Conservatives have many moral concerns that liberals sim-
ply do not recognize as moral concerns. When conservatives
talk about virtues and policies based on the ingroup/loyalty,
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity foundations, liberals
hear talk about theta waves. For this reason, liberals often
ﬁnd it hard to understand why so many of their fellow citi-
zens do not rally around the cause of social justice, and why
many Western nations have elected conservative governments
in recent years.
Why are liberals generally oblivious of the moral motivators
of conservatives? We propose that liberals make moral judg-
ments using only the logic of the co-creation mode of cognition,
while conservatives do not fully trust on the outcomes of the
co-creation mode and default to varying degrees of the coping
mode logic. The result is that conservatives seem to use 2+ 3= 5
moral virtues, while liberals rely on only two.
Haidt and Graham (2007) justify their ﬁve foundations of
morality from an evolutionary point of view, but they do not
go back further than mammalian care for young, and primate
behaviors. We, of course, argue that the true foundations of the
2 + 3 = 5 pattern of moral virtues can be found in the unicellu-
lar level cooperation virtues that we summarized in Table 1. In
this table we formulated two cooperation virtues (care and fair-
ness) that aim to dynamically stabilize the environment through
preventing individuals from slipping into the coping mode. In
particular we noted: “empathy might therefore be understood in
its original form as the ability to understand and be inﬂuenced by
the state of the whole environment.” which translates as a con-
cern for the state of and in particular the (potential) suﬀering of
others and the environment in general.
However, for living agents that are in the coping mode
we listed three more virtues for cooperation (ingroup loyalty,
ingroup-role adherence, and self-imposed ingroup-rationality
constraints) that allow ingroups to function as an eﬀective and
coherent whole. So we have a similar 2 + 3 = 5 pattern and
indeed very similar sounding virtues. Table 2 provides our
interpretation of the moral virtues given the logic of the coping
and the co-creation mode. Note that we interpret “harm/care”
as generalized empathy, which we deﬁned earlier as “the abil-
ity to understand and be inﬂuenced by the state of the whole
environment.” Together with “fairness/reciprocity” this allows
the implementations of “need inequality minimization” as key
strategy of the co-creation mode.
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 provides Haidt’s and Graham’s
moral virtues and their descriptions (Haidt et al., 2009). The sec-
ond column gives our more generic interpretation of the moral
virtues by connecting them to the cooperation virtues that we
deﬁned in Table 1. The third and fourth columns indicate the
degree to which the moral virtues are valued given the logic of
the conservative or coping mode and the logic of the liberal or
co-creation mode.
In this fourth example we showed that unicellular level coop-
eration virtues seem to be, as we predicted on the basis of the
Rule of Conservative Changes, fully preserved in the pattern of
(human) moral behavior. And again the distinction between the
coping mode and the co-creation mode is the deﬁning factor.
TABLE 2 | Haidt’s moral values (first column) compared to conservative and liberal morals.
Virtue Interpretation Conservative
Coping mode
Liberal
Co-creation mode
(1) Harm/care
Basic concerns for the suffering of others,
including virtues of caring and compassion.
Generic.
Requires the ability to understand
and be influenced by the state of
the whole environment and the
individuals in it.
Valued, but typically more for ingroups
and on short and medium timescales,
not a virtue extended to outgroups in
times of anxiety.
Highly valued liberal key virtue,
extended to unknown others, even
in times of conflict.
(2) Fairness/reciprocity
Concerns about unfair treatment, inequality,
and more abstract notions of justice.
Generic.
Requires understanding of adverse
consequences of inequality.
Typically valued to prevent problems
with unfair treatment of self or ingroup if
not adequately justified. Not relevant for
outgroups in times of anxiety.
Highly valued liberal key strategy,
basis of mutual cooperation,
extended to unknown others, even
in times of conflict.
(3) Ingroup/loyalty
Concerns related to obligations of group
membership, such as loyalty, self-sacrifice
and vigilance against betrayal.
Specific for (sub-)culture.
Aimed at protection of one’s
(sub-)culture
Valued because the ingroup is the only
environment in which one is adequate.
Protecting and safeguarding the group
is a form of complexity curtailment.
Somewhat valued, however the
(in)groups are not sacred and to be
protected at all costs.
(4) Authority/respect
Concerns related to social order and the
obligations of hierarchical relationships,
such as obedience, respect, and proper
role fulfillment.
Specific for (sub-)culture.
Aimed at complexity reduction
through maximizing centrally
controlled behavior.
Valued since authorities are the ones
who are responsible for a personal
feeling adequacy and social complexity
management.
Somewhat valued, however the
need for authority is indicative of an
unnecessary dependency (a
weakness to be overcome).
(5) Purity/sanctity
Concerns about physical and spiritual
contagion, including virtues of chastity,
wholesomeness and control of desires.
Specific for (sub-)culture.
Self-imposed complexity reduction
through minimizing deviant and
group-eroding behavior.
Valued virtue associated with norm
adherence and especially resistance to
temptations to violate norms.
Somewhat valued virtue, however,
it should not prevent opportunities
for exploration and growth.
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Example 5. The Role of Positive Emotions
The co-creation mode is associated with autopoietic success and,
by extension, the co-creation mode of cognition in humans
is associated with human thriving. Thriving is not a ﬁxed or
stable state of being. On the contrary, it is a dynamically devel-
oping process of succesfully fostering, cocreating, and main-
taining relations between individuals and their environment to
fully satisfy immediate and future needs alike. Yet for all its
inherent complexity, reaching and maintaining thriving states
should be the most natural thing to do: it is what life aims
for, it is life’s measure of success. So what are the drivers and
motivators of succesful living? One deﬁnite candidate is the
set of positive moods and emotions. While negative moods
and emotions are associated with states we want to avoid or
end, positive moods and emotions are associated with states
we actively seek or aim to perpetuate. This subsection inves-
tigates whether our understanding of positive emotions com-
plies with the structure and role of the co-creation mode of
cognition.
“Relative to negative emotions, positive emotions are few in
number and rather diﬀuse (Fredrickson, 1998),” which makes
sense because unlike the coping mode’s clear need satisfac-
tion goals and focused activities, the co-creation mode is not
immediately need driven, but associated with the discovery and
maintenance of relations with other individuals and the habi-
tat as a whole. We expected that the role of positive emo-
tions could be framed in terms of the coping and co-creation
mode, and indeed Fredrickson’s Broaden-and-Build Model of
Positive Emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson and Branigan,
2005) does just that. In fact Fredrickson and Branigan (2005)
frame negative and positive emotions surprisingly similar to
our description of the coping and the co-creation mode. They
write:
Whereas many negative emotions narrow individuals’
momentary thought-action repertoires by calling forth speciﬁc
action tendencies (e.g., attack, ﬂee), many positive emotions
broaden individuals’ momentary thought–action repertoires,
prompting them to pursue a wider range of thoughts and
actions than is typical, e.g., play, explore, savor, and integrate
(Table 2).
Whereas the narrowed thought–action repertoires of nega-
tive emotions were likely adaptive to our ancestors within
speciﬁc threatening instances, the broadened thought–action
repertoires of positive emotions were likely adaptive over
the long-run. Broadened thought–action repertoires gain
signiﬁcance because they can build a variety of personal
resources.
This coheres our description of the core function of the co-
creation mode that we described in Figure 2 as “Discovering,
using, promoting, and relying on the inherent dynamics of
the environment (promoting resilience)” for which the devel-
opment of understanding is characteristic. Positive emotions
spur us to engage in our environment, to learn its properties,
and stabilize it through participation. The description of the
four positive emotions that Fredrickson and Branigan (2005)
describe in detail complies with this. In Table 3 we present
representative quotes pertaining to ‘joy,’ ‘interest,’ ‘contentment,’
and ‘love’ and interpret the quotes in terms of the co-creation
mode.
Interestingly, in a more recent paper Cohn et al. (2009) study
the term ‘ego-resilience’ which they describe as “a fairly stable
personality trait that reﬂects an individual’s ability to adapt to
changing environments.” They conclude, in complete agreement
with our discourse:
TABLE 3 | Positive emotions and the co-creation mode.
Positive
emotion
Description in relation to building and broadening of thought-action repertoire. All quotes from
(Fredrickson, 1998)
Interpretation in terms of the
co-creation mode.
Joy Joy, then, not only broadens an individual’s momentary thought–action repertoire through the urge to play,
but also, over time and as a product of recurrent play, joy can have the incidental effect of building an
individual’s physical, intellectual, and social skills.
Play; exploring and learning to rely on
the inherent dynamics of the
environment.
Interest The momentary thought-action tendency sparked by interest, according to Izard (1977) is exploration,
explicitly and actively aimed at increasing knowledge of and experience with the target of interest. Interest
generates "a feeling of wanting to investigate, become involved, or extend or expand the self by
incorporating new information and having new experiences with the person or object that has stimulated
the interest."
Discovering and exploring experiences
and sources of knowledge in the zone
of proximal development (cf Vygotskii˘,
1978)
Contentment Contentment, one could argue then, is not simple passivity, but rather a mindful broadening of a person’s
self-views and world views. Moreover, contentment appears to be the positive emotion that follows
experiences that Csikszentmihalyi (1990) described as flow (described in connection with joy): “when the
flow episode is over, one feels more ’together’ than before, not only internally but also with respect to other
people and to the world in general.... The self becomes complex as a result of experiencing flow.”
Process of consolidating newly
discovered relations to extend the
scope of understanding the
living-environment
Love In the moment, exploring, savoring, and being playful with loved ones seems to have no obvious aim other
than intrinsic enjoyment. Over time, however, the interactions inspired by love no doubt help to build and
strengthen social bonds and attachment. These social bonds are not only satisfying in and of themselves,
but are also likely to be the locus of subsequent social support. In this sense, love and the various positive
emotions experienced in love relationships (i.e., interest, joy, and contentment) build and solidify an
individual’s social resources.
Developing and nurturing strong
long-lasting bonds of trust and reliance
to dynamically stabilize the (shared)
environment.
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Positive emotions are a powerful source of growth and change,
predicting both individuals’ judgments about life and their
skills for living well. [. . .] it is not suﬃcient to appreciate or
approve of one’s life in a general way; lived experiences such
as joy and interest are what start the process of exploring,
learning, connecting, and ultimately building new resources.
Those resources can later improve one’s life, oﬀering up new
opportunities for enjoyment and resource building.
As is typical for Psychology, this deep insight, associated with
resilience buildup, could have been generalized to the role of the
co-creation mode of cognition as we have deﬁned it. Yet it is not.
Psychologists (and other specialist) have been trained not to ven-
ture outside of the bounds of their discipline. Which brings us
back to the call topic.
Prospects for a ‘Modern Synthesis’ in
the Sciences of the Mind
True, true, with no room for doubt, certain, worthy of all trust.
See, the highest comes from the lowest, and the lowest from the high-
est; indeed a marvelous work of the tao.
See how all things originated from it by a single process.
First three lines of a hypothetical original of the Emerald tablet of
Hermes (Needham and Ping-Yu, 1980).
“As above so below” has been a valuable truth in esoteri-
cism and alchemy for many centuries. We have used the Rule of
Conservative Changes to connect the “lowest and oldest” with the
“highest and newest” and in doing so we have formulated life’s
capacity to survive and thrive as the process that not only origi-
nates all of the biosphere, but that also deﬁnes human behavior.
Starting from the unity of existence is, in our opinion, just as valu-
able today as was for the ancient minds that tried to understand
the diversity of existence.
Starting from the unity of existence might be the only, and
actually perfectly logical, method to avoid the fragmentation of
knowledge so characteristic of modern day Psychology (Newell,
1973) and other ﬁelds of science. Yet the fragmentation of knowl-
edge underlies the need for call topics like the current one:
“Prospects for a ‘Modern Synthesis’ in the sciences of the Mind.”
As we noted in example 1, our Western “left-hemispheric” –
coping – world-view favors a narrow focus over the broader
picture, specialists over generalists, fragmentation over uniﬁ-
cation, and knowledge and intelligence over experience and
wisdom. For science this is also the case. To quote Einstein,
“Problems cannot be solved with the same mind set that created
them.”
Although we hope that this paper is an example of the
strengths of the coping mode (i.e., the scientiﬁc method), it
did essentially depend on the co-creation mode of cognition
and more speciﬁcally on the positive emotions that guided us
through the process. It was the joy of playing with the con-
cepts and results of other thinkers that motivated us and kept
us going in the absence of tangible results. It was our inter-
est in phenomena just out of reach and in tantalizingly vague
associations between disparate ﬁelds of science that gave us
direction. And we felt contentment after hours of ﬂow as a
sign of achievement without us being able to specify what
we actually had achieved. Finally, our friendships allowed us
to be scathingly critical and supportive at the same time, to
be patient with each other’s inability to formulate gut feel-
ings in a clear manner, and turn this into a collaborative
project.
Although not generally acknowledged, these positive emo-
tions, motivations, and gut feelings are a normal part of science
(Scheﬀer, 2014). They should become a central part of science if
we really want to pool the insights and wisdom of (among others)
scientists to allow us realistic “prospects for a conceptual synthe-
sis or convergence of research focused on understanding mind
and mindedness” (cf the call text).
What is probably not (yet) a normal part of science is our
disrespect for arbitrary disciplinary boundaries. If the aim is
a unity of science, it makes little sense to start with arbi-
trary (or opportunistic) disciplinary boundaries and then hope
that one or a few new disciplines or research hypes will,
uncharacteristically, not add to more fragmentation but lead
to uniﬁcation instead. Just as unlikely is some sort of “mir-
acle” or super insight that allows us to mentally reconstruct
a city by combining the rubble of more and more individual
buildings.
Instead we argue for a complementary approach: a search
for unity based on the essential and the invariant. We should
start with the unity of existence and add detail only when
we know how the details relate to the whole. Of course we
do not know what is most essential and invariant. Yet, as the
quote above suggests, we are also not fully unaware. What is
really essential and invariant has inﬂuenced life in general and
humanity in particular over its existence. The essential and the
invariant deﬁne us and are as such coded deep in each of us.
In fact our Western culture, for all that it brought us, might
have obscured the essential and allowed us to live according
to the logic of the coping mode while maintaining the illu-
sion that we thrive and understand our existence (McGilchrist,
2010).
In this paper we used the Rule of Conservative Changes
and the deﬁning properties of life as invariant ‘truths” that
allowed us to come up, among other connections, with the
concept map in Figure 2 that connects and speciﬁes a num-
ber of core concepts of the behavioral sciences. While we
expect that these two concepts are “pretty essential” and as
such highly productive, we do not yet dare to claim that
they go to the very core. This requires much more work,
and probably reformulations of concepts and a sharpening
of our reasoning. It needs a lot of reﬂecting and wrestling
(playing actually) with results, insights, and hunches to make
them all ﬁt. Above all it requires the freedom and friendships
to do so.
Finally, to answer the question that we started with: the ori-
gins of “the capacity to live life to the beneﬁt of self and others”
are not uniquely human. These originate in the deﬁning prop-
erties of life and more explicitly in the inability of early life to
evaluate its state separately from its environment. This “original
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perspective” allowed life to improve its own state by contributing
to an easier-to-live-in environment and eventually to the creation
of the biosphere. In humans this holistic understanding is pre-
served as empathy and wisdom. And although wisdom is still
informing our ethical and political choices, it has to compete with
pressing demands and the coping mode’s intelligent exploitation
of environmental utility. Yet if intelligent power play wins too
often it will destroy our environment as an adverse side eﬀect.
Only our “inability to separate us from our environment,” and
the wisdom it leads to, can prevent this.
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